Abstract. We present a simple method for constructing identi cation schemes resilient against impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. Though zero-knowledge or witness hiding protocols are known to withstand attacks of the rst kind, all such protocols previously proposed su er from a weakness observed by Bengio et al. : a malicious veri er may simply act as a moderator between the prover and yet another veri er, thus enabling the malicious veri er to pass as the prover. We exhibit a general class of identi cation schemes that can be eciently and securely tranformed into identi cation schemes withstanding an adaptive man-in-the-middle attacker. The complexity of the resulting (witness hiding) schemes is roughly twice that of the originals. Basically, any three-move, public coin identi cation scheme that is zero knowledge against the honest veri er and that is secure against passive impersonation attacks, is eligible for our transformation. This indicates that we need only seemlingly weak cryptographic intractability assumptions to construct a practical identi cation scheme resisting adative man-in-themiddle impersonation attacks. Moreover, the required primitive protocols can e ciently be constructed under the factoring or discrete logarithm assumptions.
Introduction
An (public key) identi cation scheme (see for instance 9] ) is an (interactive) protocol by means of which one party (the prover) proves its identity to another party (the veri er). Securing log-in procedures is a main application of such schemes. An identi cation scheme consists of an algorithm to generate public-key/private-key pairs, and a protocol for the prover and the veri er. The collection of eligible key-pairs is chosen such that it is infeasible to compute a corresponding private key when only the public key is observed. Typically, the protocol's purpose is to show that the prover \knows" the private key that corresponds to the prover's public key. Most known identi cation schemes take the form of three move interactive where the veri er is required to send a random bitstring as a challenge. For such methods to be secure, the veri er must not be able to extract this private key from the prover. Formally, this notion of security is captured by considering adaptive impersonation attacks. The (probabilistic polynomial time) attacker is given a prover, who has access to a key-pair as produced by the key-generation algorithm, as a black-box. Thus, the attacker only sees the prover's outputs as dictated by the identi cation protocol and not any of its internal coin ips, private inputs, etc. Next, the attacker is allowed to query the black-box a polynomial number of times, playing the role of a (malicious) veri er. This means that the attacker is allowed to choose the challenges in any way thought suitable to extract information about the private key. In particular, the choice of any next challenge may depend on the entire history of the attack and public key. Next, the attacker is denied any further access to this black-box prover. The identi cation scheme is called secure against adaptive impersonation attacks if the attacker is still unable to impersonate the prover (execute the prover's part of the protocol, facing an honest veri er).
In 4] a weakness of identi cation schemes proposed until then was exposed. There, the authors explained how a malicious man-in-the-middleṼ may abuse his conversations with an honest prover P to misrepresent himself as P to yet another veri er V . The attack is not by cryptographic ingenuity. But, simply pretending to be a veri er himself,Ṽ actually forwards V 's challenges to P and forwards P's replies to V . Thus, while P is under the impression that he is identifying himself toṼ , he is actually identifying himself to V , to the possible advantage ofṼ . A remedy suggested in 4] has the prover and veri er (rather the devices that represent them) isolate themselves physically from the outside world. A Faraday's cage could be a suitable implementation. However, for identi cation over networks, for instance, this measure seems not to be useful. We present a simple method to construct identi cation schemes resilient against adaptive impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. Though zero-knowledge 13] or witness hiding protocols 10] are known to withstand attacks of the rst kind, all such protocols previously proposed su er from the weakness observed by Bengio e.a. 4], since a malicious veri er may simply act as a moderator between the prover and yet another veri er, thus enabling the malicious veri er to pass as the prover. Using a three-move public coin protocol that is collision intractable (without knowing the private key, it is infeasible to pass the protocol) and honest veri er zero knowledge we build a witness-hiding identi cation scheme that di ers from previous proposals in that an execution of a given proof of identity can only be unambiguously appreciated by the intended veri er. This is achieved by having the prover direct the protocol to the intended veri er's public key. It is consequently shown that resilience against man-in-the-middle-attacks follows from this approach. Note that the required primitive protocol corresponds to an identi cation scheme secure against passive impersonation and honest veri ers. Directing a proof to an intended veri er has been considered by other researchers in a di erent context, as we will explain later. Our contribution is to provide a general, secure and e cient immunization against adaptive man-in-the-middle impersonation attacks in identi cation schemes. Furthermore, we want the immunization to work even if the the orginal identi cation scheme satis es only weak security properties. Example schemes that satisfy our requirements include Schnorr's scheme based on discrete logarithms 18] or Guillou-Quisquater's scheme based on RSA 15] . But more generally, any one-way group homomorphism or any pair of claw-free trapdoor permutations gives rise to the desired building block. If we would take, for example, Schnorr's scheme 18] as input to our constructions, the resulting identi cation scheme would have twice the complexity (in terms of computation and communication) of 18]. But we are then able to prove that our scheme is witness-hiding and resilient against man-in-the-middle attacks if computing discrete logarithms is hard. Conceptually, our method to disable man-in-the-middle attacks is as follows. Let X and Y be two players, where X wishes to identify himself to Y . Suppose now that we have an e cient method by which X could take Y 's public key, and his own key-pair (his public key and secret key), and securely prove the statement \I know X's secret key or I know Y 's secret key". If this protocol is witness indistinguishable (no information is released as to which is the case), only Y can be sure he is talking to X rather than anyone else. For, any other veri er Z would only know that he is talking to X or Y . Thus, if X directs his proof to Y as outlined above, the proof is unambiguous only to Y .
So why would this help against man-in-the-middle attacks? By the symmetry of the statement proved and by the asserted witness-indistinguishability of the proof, if Y could abuse his conversation with X to pass as X at Z as the manin-the-middle would do, he must be able to do so without talking to X. Thus the man-in-the-middle attack reduces to a cryptographic attack. But now we invoke the witness-indistinguishability again to show that if Y 's attack would succeed, he could compute X's secret key. This then contradicts our assumption that it is hard to compute the secret key from a random public key. We stress that this approach makes sense only if the keys are su ciently indepedently generated. In the extreme case that two veri er keys are identical, it is clear that man-inthe-middle attacks are still feasible. More generally, a proof of security will fail if there is dependendence among these keys: if one is chosen as a clever function of the other (such as a random and secret power of a given key based on discrete logarithms), proof given to one veri er may still be \diverted" to another veri er. In Sections 6 and 7 we discuss this matter in detail and give examples of how proper key-generation can be enforced. We note that the same basic idea of proving one of two statements in order to direct a proof to one speci c veri er was found independently by Jacobson, Impagliazzo and Sako in 16]. Their main motivation was to make undeniable signature schemes more secure and non-interactive. Their method for building a veri er designated protocol uses a trapdoor bit commitment scheme. In comparison, our method shows that if you start with a protocol of a certain form, then a separate trapdoor bit commitment is not needed. On the other hand, their methods works for some protocols that are not of the form we consider. We also note that, in a di erent context, Chaum 5] proposed using trapdoor commitment schemes to ensure that only a particular veri er can appreciate a given proof. Dolev, Dwork and Naor 8] have introduced non-malleable cryptography, a theoretical primitive that includes prevention of man-in-the-middle attacks in a number of scenarios, and have proposed protocols that work under general cryptographic assumptions. It is not so much the concept explained above that we advocate as the most signi cant contribution here. We would like to stress that the concept has been applied implicitly before, prior to 16]. 16] is the rst paper applying the ideas to veri er-directed proofs, however. We know of at least one example, namely the protocol of Feige and Shamir 12] for bounded round general zero knowledge proofs. There, the prover commits to a witness for the NP-statement to be proved using an unconditionally hiding trapdoor commitment scheme, an instance of which is generated by the veri er. Indeed, the proof conducted there can be seen as showing that the NP-statement is true, or that the prover knows the veri er's trapdoor! To get the designated veri er proofs for general languages, postulated in 16] but not given, we can use the result of 12] and make sure that veri ers' instances of the trapdoor commitment scheme are independently generated. In our setting, we restrict ourselves to the problem of identi cation, and attempt to formulate a very e cient solution to the problem of identi cation in the presence of an adaptive man-in-the-middle attacker. Moreover, we are only interested in solutions that allow for some well-de ned and accepted cryptographic intractability assumption to be reduced to the security of the identi cation scheme. It is interesting to note that our results apply to a general class of identi cation schemes which in their normal mode of operation need only satisfy seemingly weak security properties. Namely, zero knowledge with respect to the honest veri er and collision intractability (that is, the scheme is secure against passive impersonation attacks). As a result of our simple and e cient transformation, we obtain the required security level, namely security against adaptive man-inthe-middle attackers. Technically speaking, our approach is close to the ones taken in 7, 6] . However, it is not clear from those papers (which may partly be seen as investigations into witness hiding) how we can e ciently obtain security against adaptive manin-the-middle attackers in our context. Please note that such was neither clear from 16], since there the focus is on undeniable signatures. Although it appears to be true that their approach using trapdoor bitcommitments has a wider applicability than that, their approach does not indicate that immunization of an identi cation scheme against man-in-the-middle attackers, can be done eciently and securely even if the given scheme is only weakly secure in normal mode of operation, as we discussed above. Please note that digital signatures also lead to identi cation schemes secure against impersonation and man-in-the middle attacks. The prover would simply sign a message consisting of the concatenation of a random challenge (supplied by the veri er) and the veri er's public key. Although we feel that our schemes could compare favorably in terms of practical value to even such solutions, we like to point out that we aim for a practical identi cation scheme that is proven secure if some standard cryptographic intractability assumption holds. Seen in this light, digital signatures, for example, with such proven security, i.e. signatures secure against adaptively chosen message attacks, still come at too high a price in this context. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable here to use them for key-certi cation. Note that in this signature based approach, the prover (in this case the signer) leaves a trace: the veri er can later prove to a third party that he talked to the prover. In some cases this is undesirable as it might damage the privacy of the prover. This problem is not present in our approach: because the veri er could (using his own secret key) simulate the protocol perfectly, he cannot use a transcript of the protocol to convince a third party. If one aims at practical value and proven security (relative to a plausible assumption), it may be true that our proposal for identi cation schemes secure against impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks comes close to what one could reasonably achieve in this area, due to its conceptual simplicity and e cient implementation. This work is organized as follows. First, we de ne a general class of \weak" identi cation schemes in Section 2, to be used later as the building block for our transformation. The existence of our building blocks is discussed in Section 5. The main result and its proof of security are given in Sections 3 and 4. Section 6 discusses in detail the key-generation requirements. Finally, we give an application to access-control in Section 7.
Model
We de ne the basic ingredients to our results.
-Protocols Let (A; B) be a three move protocol where the prover A speaks rst. The veri er B is required to send random bits only. A and B are probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machines. The protocol (A; B) resembles a proof of knowledge for a binary relation R (see for instance 9] for details), in that the prover can always make the veri er accept on common input x, if the prover knows w such that (x; w) 2 R. By running (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm a( ) on x and his secret witness w, the prover A computes his initial message a. After having received the initial message, the veri er B chooses a bitstring c 2 f0; 1g tB uniformly at random, and sends it as a challenge to A.
The challenge length t B is assumed to depend only on the binary length of the common input x (and the protocol (A; B) of course). The prover completes the conversation by running (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm z( ) on x, w, a, c, thereby possibly re-using the random bits used in the computation of the initial message. The resulting response z is submitted to the veri er. By invoking the (probabilistic) polynomial time procedure , the veri er tests the validity of the conversation. We call such a protocol (A; B) with the properties described above a -protocol 1 for relation R. Required Security Properties First, we need the protocol to satisfy a weak form of knowledge-soundness.
De nition 1. Let k be a security parameter for protocol (A; B). Suppose we are given a PPT generator G for relation R that on input 1 k produces (x; w) 2 R, such that no PPT algorithm E, given x as input, can generate two accepting conversations (a; c; r), (a; c 0 ; r 0 ) with c 6 = c 0 (a \collision for x"), except with negligible probability of success (probability taken over the coin ips of E and G). Then (A; B) is called collision intractable over G.
Note that we don't require that a witness can be extracted from a successful prover. Thus, the protocol need not be a proof of knowledge. The property implies that, given as input a random instance x only, it is infeasible to construct a successful prover for that instance. In particular it follows from our assumptions that it must be hard to compute a witness w from a given x (when x is generated according to G). By a standard rewinding argument (see Bellare Proposition 2. Let a -protocol (A; B) for relation R be given, and let x 2 f0; 1g . Suppose that A is an arbitrary PPT prover such that (A ; B) succeeds with probability , on common input x. Let T A (x) be A 's running time and suppose that > 1=2 tB . Then there exists a probabilistic algorithm Ext that outputs two accepting conversations x; a; c; z and x; a; c 0 ; z 0 with c 6 = c 0 (that is, a collision), with expected running time polynomial in T A (x) and 1=( ?1=2 tB ).
Ext is allowed to run A as a rewindable blackbox. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of Ext and A . Next, we will assume the protocol (A; B) to be honest veri er zero-knowledge, that is, we only demand that conversations with the honest veri er can be simulated (perfectly). 1 Of course, there is nothing new about three move, public coin protocols as such in cryptography, but we have decided to give them a name, derived from zig-zag and Merlin-Artur (see 2])
De nition 3. Let (x; w) 2 R. Let a prover A and a veri er B execute (A; B), both following the protocol. Let x be the common input and let w be private input to the prover. Suppose we are given a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm M with the following properties.
1. On input x, M outputs an accepting conversation. 2. The distribution of the conversations generated by A and B is equal to M(x).
Then (A; B) is said to satisfy honest veri er zero knowledge, with simulator M.
Relation with Identi cation Schemes We can view a -protocol (A; B) for relation R as an identi cation scheme by identifying a public/private key-pair with a pair (x; w) 2 R, as generated by some given generator G.
It is easy to see that such a protocol constitutes an identi cation scheme secure against passive attacks, if (A; B) is collision-intractable over G and if the length t B of the challenges is large enough, say linear in the security parameter. Indeed, by Proposition 2, we can extract collisions with non-negligible probability from a passive attacker (that is, one which is given the public x only) having nonnegligible probability of success. But this would contradict our assumption that (A; B) is collision-intractable over G.
Adding honest veri er zero knowledge to our requirements, makes sure that the resulting scheme is secure against random challenge atacks. By this we mean that even an attacker which is allowed to query a prover on random challenges, cannot later pose as that prover. Note that we use here the previous observation that collision-intractability implies security against passive attacks. Security against adaptive attacks means that even though the attacker is allowed to query a prover on any challenge of his choice and in an adaptive fashion, it can still not later pose as that prover. This is basically the notion of security from 11]. The adaptive man-in-the-middle attacker, is one which has \adaptive access" to a prover X as well. Additionally however, the attacker is allowed to pose as any veri erỸ out of a given set V of veri ers, and have X identify itself to this veri er. The attacker's goal is to make an honest veri er Y , with Y 6 2 V , accept X, possibly running executions of X's identi cation to anyỸ 2 V online. If this is infeasible for any PPT attacker, we say that the identi cation scheme is secure against adaptive man-in-the-middle impersonation. Note that our de nition combines the notions of security from Feige et al. 11] and Bengio et al. 4]. Our purpose is to transform identi cation schemes that are only secure against random challenge attacks into ones that withstand even adaptive man-in-themiddle impersonation, which seems to be the most desirable security level for public key identi cation schemes.
Let (A; B) be a collision-intractable -protocol for relation R and generator G. Suppose that (A; B) is honest veri er zero-knowledge, with simulator M, and that the challenge length t B is linear in the security parameter k. Thus, by the remarks above, (A; B) constitutes an identi cation scheme secure against random challenge attacks. Our purpose is to transform (A; B) into a new identi cation scheme which is secure against adaptive man-in-the middle impersonation. This transformation works as follows.
Key Generation A keypair (x; w) 2 R, consisting of a public key x and a secret key w, for participant X is generated as (x; w) G(1 k ) for an appropriate security parameter k. The public key x is placed in X's public directory. The secret key w is held privately.
Identi cation of X to Y Here, participant X will identify itselfto participant Y . Let their respective public keys be x and y, and let X's secret key be w. The claimed identi cation protocol runs as follows. Please note that the secret key of the veri er Y is not used during the identication. One can imagine a scenario where the set of provers is disjoint from the set of veri ers. In this case, no storage of secret data is required at the veri er's side. From a technical point of view the protocol above is quite similar to that given in Corollary 13 from 7] (while collision-intractability and honest veri er zero knowledge as a building block is taken from 6]). That result may be viewed as a way to transform identi cation schemes secure against random challenge attacks into ones that withstand adaptive challenge attacks only. The cryptographic assumptions needed here are potentially weaker. But most importantly, here we show how the protocol from Corollary 13 7] can be \re-arranged" so as to withstand even man-in-the-middle attackers. Thus from the point of view of functionality, the protocol presented here is superior. Another di erence is that here the length of the public key is invariant under the transformation.
Security Analysis
We give proof of security under the assumption that the participants' keys are generated as prescribed in the Key Generation protocol. In Section 6 we explain in detail why this assumption is needed and we also propose ways of enforcing this. An application where this condition is satis ed in a natural way is presented in Section 7. Before we give the proof, we 'd like to point out that an execution of the protocol from Section 3 leaves no trace, in the sense that a veri er Y cannot later prove to a third that X identi ed itself to Y earlier. This follows from the symmetry of the protocol: Y can generate the conversations of the identi cation of X to Y with exactly the same distribution on its own. Proof. The idea is as follows. First we generate public key x 0 according to G, and discard the corresponding secret key. We show that, if the protocol were not witness hiding or were not resilient against man-in-the-middle attacks, there
exists an e cient algorithm that takes x 0 as input and outputs a collision for x 0 in the protocol (A; B). But this would then contradict (A; B)'s collisionintractability.
The following game is easily be seen as modelling the situation. Let m be polynomial in the security parameter k. We generate m public keys with known secret keys by running G m times. We ip a coin b. If The game consists of two stages.
1. The attacker gets the following prover as a black-box. We de ne P as the prover who gets x and all public keys y i as input, plus the secret keys as generated above. P can perform the identi cation protocol for all pairs (x; y i ). The attacker is allowed to play with P (as a blackbox, but not rewindable) for a polynomial amount of time. Then, the attacker gives us a number j 0 2 f1; : : :; ng, and hands back P. This models the idea that before the real attack, the attacker may try to extract as much information as needed for winning in the second stage.
2. With probability (m + 1)=(2m), the attacker chose j 0 = j such that P was not given the secret key for y j in the beginning or was not given the secret key for x. Let's assume that this event happens (If not, we re-run the previous stage). Next, the attacker gets as input the secret keys for all public keys y i with i 6 = j. This models the idea that (possibly via a man-in-the-middle attack), the attacker tries to pass as X to any other veri er intended by X.
To make the proof easier, we just give the attacker the secret keys which allow him to perfectly simulate X's behaviour at any other site than Y j , rather than giving him X as a blackbox: if he can't do it with the secret keys, than he certainly can't when he is given X as a blackbox who only identi es himself at Y i with i 6 = j. The attacker wins the game, if he can pass the protocol against the honest veri er on input (x; y j ). Let's assume that the attacker won with probability > 2 ?tB (recall that t B is assumed to be of linear size in k). Then, by Proposition 2, we can extract a collsion for y j or for x from the attacker (running it as a rewindable blackbox) with expected time polynomial in the running time of the attacker and 1=( ? 1=2 tB ). Thus, if is non-negligible, then we can extract a collision from the attacker in expected polynomial time. But, this is a collision for key x 0 with probability 1=2, since the attacker cannot distinguish between the cases b = 0 and b = 1 by witness indistinguishability of the protocol (which follows by the properties of the simulator M). This contradicts the assumption that (A; B) is collision-intractable over G.
Existence
The following theorem can be derived from the results in 6], and gives an indication of the generality of our primitive.
Theorem 5. Suppose that a family of claw-free pairs of trapdoor permutations exists, or that a family of one-way group homomorphisms exists. Then there exists a -protocol for relation R, with generator G, that is collision-intractable and honest veri er zero knowledge and that has a challenge length linear in the security parameter. If based on claw-free pairs of trapdoor permutations, we can always e cientlyenforce the challenge length of (A; B) to be linear in the security parameter, while keeping the size of the initial message, the reply and the length of the common string constant in length. For one-way group homomorphisms, we can do something similar, under the condition that for each such homomorphism f, there exists a (large) prime v with the following property: for each y in the range of f, it is easy to compute a preimage x of y v (using multiplicative notation for the group operation in the range). Two important examples of such families of oneway group homomorphisms can be constructed under the factoring and discrete logarithm assumptions. We give no further details of the general construction here.
A particularly e cient implementation, for example, is obtained when (A; B), for instance, is Schnorr's protocol 18] or Guillou-Quisquater's 15]. The following example is based on Schnorr's identi cation protocol. Let G q be a group of prime order q such that computing discrete logarithms in G q is hard. Let g be a xed member of G q .
